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Zurek claims to have derived Born’s rule noncircularly in the context of an onto-
logical no-collapse interpretation of quantum states, without any “deus ex machina
imposition of the symptoms of classicality.” After a brief review of Zurek’s deriva-
tion it is argued that this claim is exaggerated if not wholly unjustified. In order
to demonstrate that Born’s rule arises noncircularly from deterministically evolving
quantum states, it is not sufficient to assume that quantum states are somehow
associated with probabilities and then prove that these probabilities are given by
Born’s rule. One has to show how irreducible probabilities can arise in the context
of an ontological no-collapse interpretation of quantum states. It is argued that the
reason why all attempts to do this have so far failed is that quantum states are fun-
damentally algorithms for computing correlations between possible measurement
outcomes, rather than evolving ontological states.
Keywords: Born’s rule; envariance; interpretation of quantum mechanics; probabil-
ity.
1 Introduction
In any metaphysical framework that treats quantum states as deterministically evolving
ontological states, such as Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, Born’s rule has to be
postulated. Repeated attempts to derive Born’s rule within the many-worlds framework
have proved circular, as was noted even by its proponents. (For references see [1].) In
the context of environment-induced decoherence, Born’s rule emerges naturally [2] but
decoherence is based on reduced density matrices, and the partial tracing that leads to
reduced density matrices is predicated on Born’s rule. No noncircular derivation of Born’s
rule has ever been put forward in the context of an ontological no-collapse interpretation
of quantum states.
Recently, however, Wojciech H. Zurek has claimed to have shown how Born’s rule
arises noncircularly “in a purely quantum setting, i.e., without appeals to ‘collapse,’
‘measurement,’ or any other such deus ex machina imposition of the symptoms of clas-
sicality that violate the unitary spirit of quantum theory” [1, 3, 4]. After a brief review
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of Zurek’s derivation in Sec. 2, it is argued that this claim is exaggerated if not wholly
unjustified. In order to demonstrate that Born’s rule arises noncircularly from deter-
ministically evolving ontological quantum states (DEOQS), it is not sufficient to assume
that quantum states are somehow associated with probabilities and then prove that these
probabilities are given by Born’s rule, as Zurek has done.
Section 3 offers an instructive attempt to complete Zurek’s derivation by demonstrat-
ing how irreducible probabilities—probabilities associated not with averaged states but
with microstates of individual systems—can arise in the context of an ontological no-
collapse interpretation of quantum states. The attempt fails because it tacitly relies on
decoherence and thus makes implicit use of Born’s rule. It is argued in Sec. 4 that this is
not a failing of only this particular attempt but a failing of the notion that quantum states
are evolving ontological states, rather than being fundamentally algorithms for computing
correlations between possible measurement outcomes. It is further argued that Gleason’s
theorem [5] and more recent Gleason-like derivations of Born’s rule [6, 7, 8] offer a deeper
understanding of the axioms of standard quantum theory than Zurek’s does. (See also
the comment by Schlosshauer and Fine [9] on Zurek’s derivation of Born’s rule.)
2 Zurek’s derivation of Born’s rule
The following assumptions are made:
(i) The universe consists of systems.
(ii) The states of a system S are (associated with) the normalized elements |ψ〉 of a
Hilbert space that describes S.
(iii) A composite system is described by the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the
constituent systems.
(iv) States evolve according to ih¯|ψ˙〉 = H|ψ〉 where H is Hermitean.
Envariance (environment–assisted invariance) is defined as follows: If for a vector |ψS&E〉
associated with the composite system S&E , where E is a dynamically decoupled envi-
ronment of S, and for a transformation US = uS ⊗ 1E there exists a transformation
UE = 1S ⊗ uE such that
UEUS |ψS&E〉 = |ψS&E〉 (1)
then |ψS&E〉 is envariant under uS .
Suppose that
N∑
k=1
ak|sk〉 ⊗ |εk〉 (2)
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is a biorthonormal (Schmidt) decomposition of |ψS&E〉, and that
uS |sk〉 = eiφk |sk〉, k = 1, . . . , N. (3)
For any set of coefficients ak and any set of integers lk the effect of uS on |ψS&E〉 can be
undone by
uE |εk〉 = e−i(φk+2pilk)|εk〉. (4)
Thus |ψS&E〉 is envariant under uS . Since the properties of S&E , as well as the respective
properties of S and E , are fully determined by |ψS&E〉, no feature of |ψS&E〉 that is affected
by uS can represent a property that is possessed by S while the joint state of S&E is
|ψS&E〉. It follows that the phases of the coefficients ak in a biorthogonal decomposition
of |ψS&E〉 cannot represent properties of (or contain information about) S.
If any two of the coefficients in the decomposition (2) have equal norms—say, a1 =
|a|e−iφ1 and a2 = |a|e−iφ2—then |ψS&E〉 is also envariant under the swap
uS(1↔2) = eiφ12 |s1〉〈s2|+ e−iφ12 |s2〉〈s1|, (5)
which can be undone by the “counterswap”
uE(1↔2) = e−i(φ12+φ1−φ2+2pil12)|ε1〉〈ε2|+ ei(φ12+φ1−φ2+2pil12)|ε2〉〈ε1|. (6)
It follows that the information about S contained in |ψS&E〉 is envariant under uS(1↔2).
This leads Zurek “to conclude immediately that the probabilities for any two swappable
|sk〉 are equal” [3]. He further concludes that if all of the coefficients in the decomposi-
tion (2) have equal norms—in which case |ψS&E〉 is invariant under any re-labeling of the
states |sk〉—the probability p(sk) must be equal to 1/N for all k. Observers who know
the state of S&E to be |ψS&E〉 with ak = e−iφk/
√
N are “provably ignorant” of (the state
or the properties of) S. They will therefore “conclude that the probabilities of all the
envariantly swappable outcomes must be the same” [1].
To complete his derivation of Born’s rule, Zurek considers the case in which the
coefficients ak in the decomposition (2) are proportional to
√
mk with natural numbersmk,
so that the norms |ak|2 are commensurate. (The assumption that all coefficients have
the same phase is warranted by the fact that, as shown, the phases of the Schmidt
coefficients are irrelevant as far as the properties of S concerned.) He then extracts from
E a “counterweight” A such that
|ψA&S&E〉 ∝
N∑
k=1
√
mk|Ak〉 ⊗ |sk〉 ⊗ |εk〉. (7)
By “increasing the resolution of A”,
|Ak〉 =
mk∑
jk=1
|ajk〉/
√
mk, (8)
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and letting A interact with E so that
|ajk〉 ⊗ |εk〉 → |ajk〉 ⊗ |ejk〉 (9)
with orthonormal vectors |ejk〉, he reduces this case to the case of coefficients with equal
norms. The upshot: Born’s rule p(sk) = mk/M , whereM =
∑N
k=1mk. The generalization
to coefficients with incommensurate norms is straightforward.
3 Whence the probabilities?
As said, in order to demonstrate that Born’s rule arises noncircularly from
DEOQS, it is not sufficient to assume that quantum states are somehow associated with
probabilities and then prove that these probabilities are given by Born’s rule. What is
thereby proved is that if quantum states are associated with probabilities then Born’s
rule holds. But how do quantum states come to be associated with probabilities? As long
as this questions remains unanswered, one has not elucidated the origin of probabilities
in quantum physics, as Zurek claims to have done [3].
Zurek abruptly concludes that “the probabilities for any two swappable |sk〉 are equal.”
If these states are associated with probabilities then it is certainly the case that “swap-
pable” implies “equiprobable.” But the idea that states are associated with probabilities
comes out of the blue, without justification. What envariance under uS(1↔2) does imply
is a symmetry with regard to the properties s1 and s2. If these properties are mutually
exclusive, S cannot simultaneously possess both, but it may possess neither of them: the
propositions “S is/has si” (i=1, 2) may both be false, or else they may both lack truth
values (i.e., the physical situation may be such that these propositions are neither true
nor false but meaningless).
Can Zurek’s incomplete derivation of Born’s rule from DEOQS be completed by
demonstrating how irreducible probabilities—probabilities associated not with averaged
states but with microstates of individual systems—can arise in the context of an ontolog-
ical no-collapse interpretation of quantum states? Here is how one might attempt to do
this. If all of the coefficients in the decomposition (2) have equal norms, and if the prop-
erties sk are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (i.e., if the normalized |sk〉 form an
orthonormal basis) then the propositions “S is/has sk” cannot all be false. We already
know that they cannot all be true, and that if they are in possession of truth values,
they must be in possession of identical truth values. We conclude that they cannot be in
possession of truth values. If all Schmidt coefficients have equal norms and the |sk〉 form
an orthonormal basis, these propositions are neither true nor false. But if predicative
propositions can lack truth values, a criterion has to exist: under what conditions does
such a proposition possess a truth value?
In the spirit of Zurek’s “existential interpretation” [1, 2] (in the context of which
Zurek’s claims ought to be evaluated, if only to be fair) we may require the existence
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of a record. A truth value exists if and only if one is indicated by, or inferable from, a
predictably evolving pointer state—a record. Once we have reached this point, we can
with sufficient justification assign probabilities to all possible value-indicating states or
records (“measurement outcomes”) inasmuch as we cannot predict the actual outcome.
(If we could, we could assign truth values to the propositions “S is/has sk” in advance of
the outcome.) And if all coefficients in the decomposition (2) have equal norms, we can
invoke the principle of indifference and deduce from the nonexistence of truth values that
all of those propositions are equally likely to come out true in the event that a record of
their truth values is created.
Is this attempt to complete Zurek’s derivation of Born’s rule noncircular? I don’t
think so. Probabilities are associated with possibilities, and the relevant possibilities are
possible measurement outcomes, or outcome-indicating states, or records. How do records
enter the picture? By Zurek’s account, through correlations. The recorded properties are
those that are entangled with the most predictable states of the environment or of parts
thereof. And the most predictable states are the most abundantly monitored ones—the
ones entangled with the largest number of subsystems of the environment. The infor-
mation recorded in them is so abundantly replicated that it is for all practical purposes
indelible. And why are the most abundantly monitored states the most predictable ones?
The chief ingredient in Zurek’s answer to this question is decoherence, and decoherence in-
volves in an essential way reduced density matrices, partial tracing, and thus, ultimately,
an implicit use of Born’s rule.
Is there any other way to complete Zurek’s derivation noncircularly? I don’t think
so. The symbols sk and εk in (2) stand for possible properties of S and E . Predicative
propositions are needed to relate these properties to their respective systems. Since these
propositions are not necessarily in possession of truth values, a necessary condition for
the existence of a truth value is required. There is broad consensus that, in the context
of standard quantum mechanics (unadulterated with, e.g., Bohmian trajectories [10] or
nonlinear modifications of the “dynamical” equations [11]) this involves environment-
induced decoherence in an essential way.
There are of course ways to cloud the issue, such as Zurek’s suggestion [3] that the
uniqueness of a Schmidt decomposition (in case none of the coefficients have equal norms)
is sufficient for the existence of a unique set of pointer states. States selected by a unique
Schmidt decomposition are not necessarily pointer states. To be indicators of measure-
ment outcomes, states must retain information about outcomes, and decoherence argu-
ments are essential for establishing which states are capable of retaining such information.
Information about the (relative) values of an observable (relative as in “relative state” [1])
can be contained (via a unique Schmidt decomposition) in a system’s nonlocal properties
(or in the values of a nonlocal observable) in which case the system or observable is ex-
ceedingly unlikely to retain this information, owing to environment-induced decoherence.
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4 Moral
By simply assuming that quantum states are somehow associated with probabilities,
Zurek has glossed over the fact that the reason why quantum states are associated with
probabilities involves decoherence and hence Born’s rule. Probabilities are associated
with possibilities, and the relevant possibilities are measurement outcomes or records
thereof. I don’t see a way of introducing probabilities without introducing measurement
outcomes, no matter what other names we invent for them. My failed attempt to complete
Zurek’s derivation noncircularly is a case in point. To be able to justify the introduction
of probabilities, I had to assume that the properties sk are mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive. This assumption owes its meaning to measurements. The physical meaning of
“mutually exclusive” (as against its mathematical implementation through orthogonality)
is that if the propositions “S is/has sk” are in possession of measured truth values then
the truth of one implies the falsity of the others. The physical meaning of “jointly
exhaustive” is that if these propositions have measured truth values then at least one of
them is true. Zurek’s claim to have explained “how Born’s rule arises. . . without appeals to
‘collapse,’ ‘measurement,’ or any other such deus ex machina imposition of the symptoms
of classicality” [3] is therefore unjustified.
Zurek emphasizes that, in contrast with other derivations of Born’s rule, his “relies
on the most quantum of foundations—the incompatibility of the knowledge about the
whole and about the parts, mandated by entanglement.” “Entanglement,” too, owes
its meaning to measurements. Its physical meaning is that one can measure (at any
rate, obtain information about) the value of an observable V by measuring the value of
another observable W . Besides, what has knowledge to do with quantum foundations
in the context of an ontological interpretation of quantum states? The statement that
knowledge about the whole implies ignorance of the parts has two parts, one that conveys
a lack of factuality and one that is counterfactual. Saying that a system composed of two
spin-1/2 particles is in the singlet state is the same as saying (i) that the components of
the individual spins lack values, and (ii) that if a spin component of each particle were
measured then the results would be correlated as specified by the singlet state. There is
therefore nothing factual about this “state,” nothing that would warrant an ontological
interpretation. If there is an ontological state that is responsible for the correlations
encapsulated by the singlet state, it is not the singlet state, and that’s all we know about
it.
The rather mystical-sounding statement that knowledge about the whole implies ig-
norance of the parts is thus largely a statement about correlated probability distributions
over measurement outcomes. Given its implicit reference to probabilities, it does not
elucidate the “origin of probabilities” [1] but rather shows that probabilities are present
from the start, however cleverly they may be concealed by mystical language. If the
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quantum formalism is (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of physics and (ii) fun-
damentally what somehow it obviously is (namely, a probability algorithm) then there is
nothing ”more fundamental”—a contradiction in terms since what is “less fundamental”
just isn’t fundamental—from which probabilities could emerge.
To my mind, the conclusion to be drawn from the past failures (including Zurek’s) to
derive probabilities noncircularly from DEOQS, is that quantum states are probability
measures and should not be construed as evolving ontological states. Theorists ought to
think of them the way experimentalists use them, namely as algorithms for computing
the probabilities of possible measurement outcomes on the basis of actual measurement
outcomes. No end of pseudophysics [12] is generated by the notion that quantum states
are evolving ontological states. Then one is presented with two modes of evolution, one
unitary and one projective, and a host of ensuing pseudoproblems. The way to get rid
of these pseudoproblems is not to reject one mode of evolution but to reject them both.
The lawlike features of the world are encapsulated in correlations between value-indicating
events, not in an evolving ontological state. (The time dependence of quantum states is a
dependence on the time of a measurement, relative to the time of another measurement,
not the dependence of a state of affairs that persists and evolves.)
As long as we believe in DEOQS, the assumptions listed at the beginning of Sec. 2 are
nothing short of baffling. They can be rendered comparatively transparent by preceding
them with another assumption:
• The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is an algorithm for assigning
probabilities to possible measurement outcomes on the basis of actual measurement
outcomes.
As the following will show, this assumption elucidates assumptions (i)–(iv) provided that
one does not invoke assumption (iii) to derive Born’s rule, as Zurek does.
(i) Why does the universe consist of systems? Because our fundamental theoretical
framework is an algorithm that correlates possible outcomes of measurements that
may be performed either on the same system at different times or on different
systems in spacelike relation.
(ii) Why are the states of S normalized elements |ψ〉 of a Hilbert space?
(a) Hilbert space because we want nontrivial probabilities (probabilities greater
than 0 and less than 1) to be assigned to the possible outcomes of maximal measure-
ments (measurements yielding the greatest possible amount of information) even if
they are assigned on the basis of outcomes of maximal measurements. Nontrivial
probabilities because otherwise we would have no reason to treat quantum states as
probability measures.
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[Classically, a property is represented by a subset W of some phase space, and
the probability measure determined by a maximal measurement is represented by
a (0-dimensional) point P in that space. All probabilities are therefore trivial:
1 if P ⊂ W and 0 otherwise. This makes it possible to interpret the classical
probability measure as an evolving ontological state. If a property is represented
by a subspace W of some vector space and the probability measure determined by
a maximal measurement is represented by a (1-dimensional) ray R in that space,
probability 1 goes with R ⊂ W and probability 0 goes with R ⊥ W, which makes
room for nontrivial probabilities [13, 14].]
(b) Normalized because as a possible outcome to which a probability is assigned,
|ψ〉 is a shorthand notation for a projector |ψ〉〈ψ|, and because the probabilities it
assigns when it is an actual outcome add up to 1.
(iii) Why is a composite system “described” by the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces
of the constituent systems? Given Born’s rule, because
p(a′|a) p(b′|b) = |〈a′|a〉〈b′|b〉|2 = |[〈a′| ⊗ 〈b′|][|a〉 ⊗ |b〉]|2 . (10)
(iv) Why do states “evolve” according to ih¯|ψ˙〉 = H|ψ〉 with a Hermitian H? Because
according to Born’s rule the probability of outcome |ψ2〉 at t2 based on outcome
|ψ1〉 at t1 is given by
|〈ψ2(t2)|U(t2, t1)|ψ1(t1)〉|2, (11)
where U is unitary. And why is U unitary? Because probability is conserved
whenever the system in question persists (is stable).
Given that quantum states are probability measures, it stands to reason that they are
σ-additive positive functionals on the projection operators in a Hilbert space [15]. The
usual choice of projection operators allows one to derive the trace rule,[5] and hence Born’s
rule, for Hilbert spaces of dimension d ≥ 3, without invoking (iii), which makes it possible
to understand the probabilistic origin of (iii). By a perfectly justifiable generalization
from projection valued measures to positive operator valued measures, the trace rule can
be shown to hold for d = 2 as well [6, 7, 8]. The reason why I prefer the Gleason-like
derivations of Born’s rule (given that quantum states are probability measures) to Zurek’s
is that the latter makes it so much harder (if not impossible) to justify assumptions (iii)
and (iv).
A final word: I do not wish to give the impression that the rejection of DEOQS is a
cure-all. Rather, I believe that once our vision is no longer clouded by pseudoquestions
entailed by the notion that quantum states are evolving ontological states, we will have
a clearer view of the genuine issues, and a better chance of finding satisfactory solutions.
For discussions of these issues see Refs. [12]–[14] and [16]–[18].
8
[1] W. H. Zurek, Rev. Mod. Phys. 75, 715 (2003), quant-ph/0105127(v3).
[2] W. H. Zurek, Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. Lond. A356, 1793 (1998), quant-ph/9805065.
[3] W. H. Zurek, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 120404 (2003), quant-ph/0211037.
[4] W. H. Zurek, “Quantum Darwinism and envariance”, to appear in Science and Ul-
timate Reality: From Quantum to Cosmos , eds. J. D. Barrow et al. (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2004), quant-ph/0308163.
[5] A. M. Gleason, J. Math. Mech. 6, 885 (1957).
[6] C. A. Fuchs, in Decoherence and its Implications in Quantum Computation and
Information Transfer , eds. A. Gonis and P. E. A. Turchi (IOS Press, Amsterdam,
2001), pp. 38–82, quant-ph/0106166.
[7] P. Busch, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 120403 (2003), quant-ph/9909073.
[8] C. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, K. Manne, and J. M. Rennes, “Gleason-type derivations of
the quantum probability rule for generalized measurements”, to appear in Found.
Phys., quant-ph/0306179.
[9] M. Schlosshauer and A. Fine, “On Zurek’s derivation of the Born rule”, submitted
to Found. Phys., quant-ph/0312058.
[10] D. Bohm, Phys. Rev. 85, 166 (1952).
[11] G. C. Ghirardi, A. Rimini, and T. Weber, Phys. Rev. D 34, 470 (1986).
[12] U. Mohrhoff, “Is the end in sight for theoretical pseudophysics?”, to appear in
Progress in Quantum Physics Research, ed. V. Krasnoholovets (Nova Science Pub-
lishers, New York, 2004), quant-ph/0305095.
[13] U. Mohrhoff, Found. Phys. 32, 1313 (2002), quant-ph/0202149.
[14] U. Mohrhoff, Mod. Phys. Lett. A 17, 1107 (2002), quant-ph/0205058.
[15] J. M. Jauch, Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,
1968).
[16] U. Mohrhoff, Found. Phys. 34, 75 (2004), quant-ph/0307113.
[17] U. Mohrhoff, Found. Phys. 32, 1295 (2002), quant-ph/0202148.
[18] U. Mohrhoff, “This elusive objective existence”, to appear in Int. J. Q. Inf.
9
